Introduction
Post-crisis re-regulation of the global financial sector includes measures that will deliberately reduce the contractual freedom of both financial intermediaries and their counterparties. This trend is evident in Hong Kong, Singapore, the EU and US, and in more extreme forms through prohibitions on the sale of broad classes of instruments, as for example in Norway. It results from political demands for enhanced investor or consumer protection in response to mis-selling, or as part of a wish to contain systemic risks popularly associated since 2008 with complex financial instruments or derivatives. It differs from traditional point of sale regulation and sanctions against misconduct, and in Hong Kong and the UK, for example, signifies a failure of confidence in principles based regulation. 2 The sweep of regulation with which this article is concerned seeks to heighten investor protection through new product or business conduct rules. Product conduct regulation includes limits on uses of financial products such as credit linked or structured notes, credit default swaps, synthetic exchange traded funds (ETFs) and certain other transaction types with embedded derivatives, while rules over business conduct extend in prescriptive detail generally accepted provisions against mis-selling. 3 Both trends raise concerns that reregulation may conflict unreasonably with contracting party autonomy. This article will suggest that a compression of contractual freedom by product conduct regulation will reduce the choices reasonably available to both retail and other nonprofessional financial market participants without lowering the potential for mis-selling or systemic instability. It will also argue that certain aspects of business conduct regulation may 4 Dir 2004/39/EC OJ L145. 5 Courts in England and New York have found financial derivatives to be properly commercial rather than aleatory contracts that might be considered unenforceable, even when used for purposes accepted as speculative, 424. An alternative view is that the uncertain outcome associated with many derivatives is tantamount to gambling such that they would be unenforceable in US common law were it not for supervening legislation, see L. Stout (2011) "Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis", 1 Harv Bus L Rev 1, 1. A separate contention is that English courts have difficulty in enforcing some (but not all) derivatives where they concern intangible subjects, that is, for lack of an existing or material underlier at the time of execution, see H. Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999), pp 209-218. This helps explain contracts being made in private organised markets or exchanges, the rules for enforcement of which participants are willing to accept. Many states eliminate such uncertainty with laws exempting financial contracts from gambling restrictions, and in the UK recent legislation removed any residual doubt that aleatory contracts were necessarily unenforceable 4 not assist in providing the investor with more complete or usable information, and may even weaken the position of non-professional investors seeking remedies for mis-selling, especially since the courts in Hong Kong and England have been reluctant to recognize retail users of complex or new products as non-professional. Many current reforms may also be seen in a longer-term perspective as a shift in the balance between contractual autonomy and state involvement in commercial activity, once characterised as a steady decline in freedom of contract under English law from a libertarian Victorian peak. 6 An alternative approach that would not involve a loss of welfare would be: Second, to extend the applicability of contractual unconscionability to include the mis-selling of financial services and instruments to retail investors or consumers of financial products where those contracts result from great bargaining inequality. This article will outline the perceived need for re-regulation and the measures adopted so far in Hong Kong and certain other jurisdictions towards those ends, before proposing an alternative approach to reform. It deals with most publicly distributed financial instruments whether or not listed on an organised exchange or regarded as securities in law, but especially those commonly regarded as complex, including structured notes, deposits and synthetic
ETFs. The remarks it contains are not intended as a discussion of the individual's rights or obligations or of positive or negative freedoms; no absolute freedom exists even if confined to the right to engage in trade or exchange. 10 They will not address fraud, bargains involving negligent mis-statement or misrepresentation at the point of sale, nor the mis-selling of consumer credit or loans, although similar principles may apply to the last example.
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Intermediaries are taken to function as transaction arrangers or distributors, the latter engaging with investors at the point of sale. A single organisation may take both roles through separate legal or administrative entities. Complex products are conceptually easy to grasp and difficult to define, a combination analogous to their appeal to buyers. They may have many differing characteristics, and are often but not necessarily intended for risk preferring users. Complex instruments can be wholly unaggressive in both structure or intention, and designed according to demand for capital preservation or targeted to conservative investors just as often as they include leverage or uncertain outcomes for the risk preferring. They include instruments whose returns are contingent upon one or more exogenous events, and will often incorporate derivative distributor relationship" July 2007, available at < http://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/RSP%20Principles%20REVISEDFINAL.pdf> (visited 25 April 2013). Information flows can be poor even when one organisation is both arranger and distributor, as in a leading English misrepresentation case where a credit linked deposit arranged by one unit was wrongly described by a second as constituting rights against the deposit's reference entity elements, in some cases subject to variation during the life of the transaction such as with many synthetic ETFs and accumulators, or rolling option contracts. Legislation may grant authority to a regulator to pronounce upon the complexity of an instrument, and in some cases make disclosure demands of its seller or indicate that the product may not be made available outside a defined constituency, for example a limited number of non-retail counterparties, a consumer protection approach to securities regulation originating in the US. Contractual complexity is taken here to mean debt instruments or shares in synthetic ETFs that have an embedded derivative content that is not ordinarily separable. 26 In these cases contracts may be simple to express and execute but their design will usually be intricate.
The growth in issuance of complex securities from the 1990s took two main forms, through widely distributed securitised transactions and by highly rated frequent borrowers using debt issuance programmes to sell bespoke structured notes. The latter are issued at the instigation of professional intermediaries or high net worth (HNW) investors to suit their risk-return preferences or expectations at any time, a process known as reverse enquiry. An investor believing that its needs are met by a three year US dollar note putable to the issuer during its life if aviation fuel doubles in price can value the required option (or ask its advisor to do so), discount the cost against an interest rate index benchmark and approach the World Bank, for example, asking that it issue notes on such terms in an amount of the investor's choice. If the proposal meets the World Bank's published target borrowing costs then the issue will be agreed, 'printed' and settled quickly, the cost of funds subsidised by the value of the option sold to the investor.
The terms of this example would be worthless or costly to most investors but might suit an airline treasury that expected to be cash rich unless aviation fuel rose unexpectedly in price within three years. This description differs in no material respect from complex issues sold to retail buyers except that it results from broadly equal bargaining, even in highly structured deals. While the HNW or professional investor can readily command the attention of the issuer or arranger, it is impossible for retail investors to match that positional equality since the transactions they enter are largely standardised and the result of proprietary sales rather than bargaining. 27 True negotiations would be impossible due to excessive costs and the statutory imperative for all investors to receive like information.
Three possible solutions with respect to retail investors are first, to prohibit all sales of complex transactions; second, to circumscribe the available choice of instruments or risks;
and third, to compel intelligent disclosure so as to lessen their bargaining inequality. Only the third alternative allows broad contractual autonomy. Many jurisdictions adopt the second but the results can become arbitrary and more exculpatory than to serve investor protection.
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Since retail buyers are unable to bargain with distributors they must have access to reasonably presented information sufficient to judge the expected risks and return associated with complex instruments and how they compare with competing transactions based on similar risks or underlying assets, including instruments commonly regarded as contractually simple. 27 For an explanation of the dilemma of the courts as to whether to interfere in severely unequal contracts in standard form see F. Kessler (1943) non-professional investor's assessment given the existence of unequal bargaining power. It also represents a demanding change from current practice.
Investor protection
The concerns of early investor protection law were price fairness and investment advice rather than product design. 30 The US adopted a consumer protection ethic in the 1930s, requiring securities to be registered if intended for sale to retail investors and allow issuer disclosure to be standardised. The means by which any instrument is sold has traditionally been a function of broader legal considerations in Anglo-American jurisdictions, so that product conduct was not a focus of supervisory attention. Most jurisdictions distinguish professional and retail users of financial products in order to focus investor protection on those assumed to be most in need, and as a corollary to allow relatively wider contractual freedom to others. Retail refers to a non-professional party expected to participate modestly in any transaction, and it is generally defined either by inference with the protagonist deemed not to be sophisticated or professional, or by proxy with a ceiling on net worth or income that suggests that financial losses would cause material harm to a less well resourced user. 14 partial payment of the nominal value of the deposit. Expecting to have retained either direct or subrogated rights over GKOs, the investor began an action to recover its loss by complaining of having entered the transaction as a result of misrepresentations. The high court found for the investor but was overruled on appeal.
The deposit was arranged and marketed to investors by units of ANZ Bank including one dealing with HNW clients; Peekay was a corporate vehicle used by one such client, a Mr
Pawani. Evidence considered in the case showed that individuals concerned with the transaction in both arranging and distribution sections of ANZ did not fully understood its structure and commercial terms, and these were misrepresented to the investor orally and through an indicative term sheet prior to its agreeing in principle to the trade. The bank repeatedly made errors in communications with the investor, including issuing a contract confirmation between execution and settlement mischaracterising the deposit as a direct claim against the underlier, inadvertently confirming the investor's understanding of the deal from earlier exchanges. ANZ's appeal was allowed on two grounds; first, that pre-completion misrepresentations were cured by the investor subsequently signing (although without fully reading) a second term sheet that for the most part gave a correct description of the deposit;
and second, a five page standard form risk disclosure statement also signed by the investor at the time of execution constituted a contractual estoppel that prevented Peekay from claiming not to have understood the risk of the transaction and by implication its structure, which had been the reason for the complaint. The investor was taken to be sophisticated and risk preferring, and by implication either had adequate knowledge of synthetic credit instruments and the permissibility of non-domestic parties acquiring interests in GKOs, or the means to become satisfied as to such questions.
His reported behaviour suggests otherwise. Product specialisation is common in the financial sector, meaning that insight into one market is no necessary indication of knowledge of a second. Contracts and practices in market segments are often highly dissimilar and an expert in one field will typically know only superficially about others. Mr Pawani agreed to make the deposit believing that it would represent a direct claim against the reference entity rather than a conditional claim against ANZ. The bank was itself confused as to whether and how it was permitted to hold GKOs (and the court was not told whether ANZ had hedged its GKO risk) but its contact with Mr Pawani made representations to the effect that the investor would buy an interest in a GKO with its rouble return hedged into US dollars. A truly experienced and sophisticated investor would have known such a claim to be unreliable. 35 [2005] EWHC 830 (Comm), para 6, whose assessment was accepted by the appeal court. By contrast a later English mis-selling case involving similar but far greater losses included an exhaustive enquiry to establish whether the investor was sophisticated, so allowing the court to define the scope of duties The third concern arises in a wider context from the appeal court's decision that the investor was prevented from claiming that it entered the transaction as a result of misrepresentation having signed the distributor's risk disclosure statement when agreeing the final term sheet.
The statement required the investor to warrant that it had read and understood the terms of the transaction and was held to function as a contractual estoppel to prevent Peekay from asserting that it had not done so. Consumer Protection Act of 2010 seeks presumptively "to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices", 48 although it is unclear that its implementation will make a material difference to consumers except in relation to loans. The FSA conducted a review of UK structured retail product conduct in 2009-12, concluding with recommendations for 44 Two municipal authorities contracted in off market interest rate swaps involving expected future revenues, using the resulting upfront payments to buy CDOs that later collapsed in value. The transactions were entered partly to circumvent borrowing restrictions imposed by central government, the use of proceeds was a failure in compliance and the local government officers concerned demonstrably failed to understand the swap or CDO transactions. The domestic courts ruled that the swaps were loans, and consequently void since the authorities were empowered to borrow only for public works and purposes defined by law. Norway's media portrayed rogue financiers tricking hapless public servants and incited sharp political and regulatory responses. An English court later allowed a claim in restitution by the swap counterparty to recover sums paid to the authorities, 49 The FSA declines to categorise its proposals as a framework for supervisory conduct, even though the authority is able so to act through being empowered to provide de facto approval of contract terms, 50 as will be its successor Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) from 2013.
The extent to which regulators use discretion to intervene in product conduct is controversial, both in relation to permissible instruments and the nature of disclosure to investors. This is shown in exchanges between the FSA and a UK parliamentary committee and which bear on developments in Hong Kong. The committee observed that post-crisis re-regulation will include "a more proactive approach to conduct regulation, with a clear focus on consumer outcomes", 51 and approvingly proposed "judgement-led product intervention by the regulator", 52 including passing to the FCA authority currently held by the FSA to make public warnings over specific products. . 52 Ibid at para 145. 53 Ibid at para 160.
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"brought to you half-baked, because the industry wants to rush the products out. The regulator ends as up as the spell check for the industry, because they bring such poorly thought through products in the hope that they will have a place in the window. I think pre-approval is quite a difficult process and has many more negatives."
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These remarks might surprise Hong Kong finance specialists who see the approach to new issues and products of the SFC and the stock exchange's listing department as heavily procedural, contributing more to the length and homogeneity of disclosure documents than to useful content. Of greater concern is that they suggest a desire to avoid accountability that cannot be reconciled with recent regulatory failures, and that might be characterised as an unreasonable extension of a public interest indemnity. 54 Ibid at para 187, and see n 14 above and accompanying text.
Post-crisis product reforms introduced in
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 Amendments to the SFO permit the SFC to authorize or withhold authorisation for the sale of structured products, 55 or impose conditions on a product or its uses. 56 They also allow the SFC to designate additional instruments as structured products, while excluding certain others, presumably due to their supposed familiarity to investors.
The distinction is arbitrary, implying that not all complex financial instruments are apparently structured products. Expressly excluded from the definition are convertible and exchangeable bonds, equity warrants, and all products authorised under the Betting Duty Ordinance, Gambling Ordinance or Government Lotteries
Ordinance. 57 A new template indicates information required by the SFC when asked to authorise a structured issue, which includes self-certification by arrangers or issuers of their compliance with SFC guidance, but the framework is procedural rather than capturing the commercial and structural core of a proposed transaction.
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
Business conduct guidelines issued by the SFC acknowledge the bargaining inequality associated with retail sales of structured instruments by suggesting a cooling off period of at least five days is granted between deal execution and settlement, during which the buyer may elect not to proceed with the purchase. 59 This may be a valuable example of libertarian paternalism but is not without cost. 60 Extended and uncertain settlement periods will typically raise the price to the buyer, 24 is confined to "structured products" as now defined in the SFO, and does nothing to ensure that a willing but uncertain buyer has access to usable information while considering its decision, even if it takes advice from an unconnected source. One further effect is to lessen the likelihood of the buyer succeeding in a subsequent misselling complaint, a problem shared by other point of sale provisions.
The same guidelines also require transaction arrangers to provide potential buyers with a statement of "Product Key Facts" based on a template that resembles provisions in MiFID and the EU Prospectus Directive, 61 but lacks the imperative for completeness of pertinent, usable information that would allow an informed purchase or meaningful product comparisons. The result also resembles the practices described by BOCHK. 63 This is regrettable. Many structured financial instruments are issued through offshore special purpose vehicles established on the transaction arranger's behalf, as with programmes such as Lehman's, so that the arranger effectively sponsors the issue on behalf of an insubstantive vehicle of its own design. Placing a new responsibility on such sponsors would create incentives for more complete and informative disclosure. The SFC proposes that a sponsor of conventional new listings should "reasonably satisfy itself that all information provided to the regulators is accurate, complete and not misleading", 64 and intends that sponsors be included in Companies Ordinance provisions specifying civil and criminal liabilities for untruths contained in a prospectus, including any material omissions. 65 The corollary is that it would become incumbent on a sponsor to ensure that issue documents are such as to allow a reasonable person to form a fair opinion of the condition and profitability of the issuer. This is also a provision of the exchange's listing rules, albeit that their guidance as to the content of prospectuses is unspecific and procedural. 65 See Cap 32 ss 40 & 40A. 66 The listing rules state at LR 11.07 that a equity new issue prospectus should include "information which, according to the particular nature of the issuer and the securities for which listing is sought, is necessary to enable an investor to make an informed assessment of the activities, assets and liabilities, financial position, management and prospects of the issuer and of its profits and losses and of the rights attaching to such securities." Prospectus content guidance is given in appendices 1C and 1D respectively for debt securities and structured products, available at <http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rulesreg/listrules/mbrules/vol2.htm> (visited 25 April 2013). 67 See n 8 above.
26 certain products including some of moderate complexity, and offer to provide advice if it is thought lacking. The client can elect to transact without taking advice but in doing so will have been given notice far more adequate than contained in a risk disclosure statement or point of sale questionnaire. A contract entered this way becomes a deliberate action and likely to be less unequal. It might be argued that the force of these pre-contractual procedures will diminish through repetition but the investor's knowledge and experience would at the same time increase. The MAS has made it clear since 2009 in guidance to arrangers and distributors operating in Singapore that its business conduct concerns over complex instruments are largely confined to retail investors. . 69 See also n 18 above. 70 US law forbids onions from use as a derivative contract underlier, see US Commodity Exchange Act 7 USC 1 §13-1(a). The ban was procured in the mid-1950s by a farming lobby hostile to Chicago's commodity trading and subsists because the onion is cheap, easily degradable and unpromising as a derivative underlier but represents a modest welfare loss given that there is no evidence that trading in onion futures or options formerly caused injury to farmers. 71 Notably limits in many jurisdictions to gambling or the sale of alcohol. 72 For example, many jurisdictions limit the use of non-indemnity insurance to avoid moral hazard, discourage gambling on exogenous events, and because the nature of the insured subject cannot always be certain when the contract begins, Re-regulation as now planned or implemented will risk leaving an unequal, less open system, meaning that private organisations and the very wealthy will have access to whatever products they wish but the efficiencies of modern finance will be withheld from those that remain. The premise of this article is that regulation of financial activity has become excessively complex, costly, risk averse and intrusive, and that in certain market segments an alternative to outright restriction can be found in the proposition that welfare enhancing behavioural change can be encouraged through non-coercive means. An alternative approach 30 involving intelligent disclosure must question whether banning or severely restricting access to certain instruments represents an erosion of commercial freedom that might be justified by supervening welfare effects, notably the avoidance of systemic volatility. Do dangers associated with complex instruments as unequal bargains that are prone to deliberate or inadvertent mis-selling justify heightened supervision and appropriate public responsibility but not outright prohibition or sectoral bans? The premise of an alternative is that requiring intelligent disclosure may encourage cooperation rather than regulatory capture, and reduce the incentives for intermediaries to game the regulatory system. 31 This is a nonsensical and misconceived way to emphasise risk that has been encouraged by the SFC. It is assumed that the warning means that repayment of principal is contingent upon the occurrence of non-default events but it fails to say this plainly, indeed a conventional debt claim cannot be said to be "principal protected" unless secured and defeased with a cash deposit in the same currency as the claim. By implication it also signifies that other instruments may be "safe" if they are "principal protected" 85 The same material carries the injunction:
"These Minibonds are on offer for a limited period only, 86 so act now and talk to one of our customer service representatives today."
All product conduct rules must be intelligent, ethical, and avoid the secondary effects of Lehman's core transaction purpose, to sell securities inventory and buy third party credit protection, which by inference became the investor's embedded but undisclosed obligation. 85 An early Minibond issue was "principal protected" meaning that it was unconditionally guaranteed by Lehman Brothers. 86 Original emphasis. 87 See n 59 above.
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 No reference was made over the life of the programme to changing general market conditions and asset prices, which would in transactions arranged by reverse enquiry justify varying levels of supporting collateral.

The legal and commercial consequences of the contractual structure, including the investor's lack of rights against the arranger for inadequate disclosure. . The CDO will be linked to a portfolio of international credits. The CDO will not be an asset-backed securities CDO [nor] linked to asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities.
[…] Repayment in full of the principal of our notes at maturity will be dependent upon the redemption in full of the CDO and as such the CDO is a significant component of the risk and return profile of our notes." It thus made no mention of the factor that caused the value of the notes to collapse. 89 China Development Bank, Rmb 2.45% Bonds due 2011 Prospectus, 24 July 2009.
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The warning was coupled with a less satisfactory exculpatory declaration that the investor would be required to sign when placing an order for bonds: None of these points was highlighted for the purpose of risk evaluation or comparison with other transactions, which is something an engaged regulator could easily have required. 90 Ibid. p 12. Emphasis added. The exclusion covers anything said or written by a distributor at the point of sale.
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Product conduct regulation as now contemplated provides powerful cover for regulatory failure, and it is thus unclear that incentives exist for effective and enquiring supervision. The reforms highlighted in the preceding section unreasonably assume rational investor behaviour, have no influence on usable information, and are likely to strengthen the defence of distributors in complaints for mis-selling, making it easier to claim that the investor "was given adequate information …" An alternative approach that would not involve a loss of welfare would be: 92 91 See Joint Associations Committee, n 22 above. This proposal also conforms with IOSCO guidelines that "It is the responsibility of securities regulators to ensure the appropriate level of transparency about products and markets and the integrity of information provided to the market. [...] Enhancing the transparency around financial products should give investors the necessary information to assess the risks attached to them and, as a result, make better investment choices. Opacity, especially in an overconfident market, can encourage collective behaviour which can lead eventually to widespread losses, with adverse consequences for the real economy", see IOSCO "Mitigating Systemic Risk: A Role for Securities Regulators, Discussion Paper OR01/11 February 2011. IOSCO's focus here is mainly with lessening investor reliance on credit ratings but it is unclear that this would have made a difference after 2007-08 since all benchmarking encourages herd behaviour. 92 See n 8 above. Ordinance that until 2011 applied to structured instruments.
Intelligent disclosure requirements would include a means for investors to compare instruments, as contained in Australian regulations since 2011, 94 avoid prospectuses and similar material being merely a "disclosure of descriptive information with little or no analysis on its relevance or impact", 95 and make prospectuses available well before an issue takes place, as with Securities Commission Malaysia's prospectus exposure arrangement, which releases prospectuses for inspection and discussion prior to registration. They would also recognise that certain contracts have value to users associated with bounded rationality, and consider removing the conventional "investment cloak" and instead provide clear warnings.
To question increasing limits to contractual freedom is not necessarily to advocate a dogmatic laissez-faire economic system nor to encourage the courts to apply severe caveat emptor principles. All regulation is a limitation on contractual freedom. The present need is to address two questions, how much is acceptable as contractual restraint in terms of social policy, and is there a more favourable solution in respect of complex and other financial 36 transactions? Intelligent disclosure represents guidance rather than stricture. The argument here is that expediency caused the HKMA and SFC to pursue an extra-judicial block settlement to their local Lehman problem. The outcome may have been commercially favourable for most noteholders but leaves contractual autonomy weaker and non-accountable supervision stronger and more arbitrary. A lack of remedies (through litigation or arbitration)
against distributors for want of evidence or arrangers for due to the absence of either a contractual nexus or informed disclosure requirements suggests that the law of contract will suffer a further little death. Breach of increasingly arduous HKMA and SFC codes of conduct provides a license threatening sanction against banks or securities dealers but leaves the investing public with fewer remedies, and reliant on the moral authority of unchallengeable regulators.
